In order to identify the extent to which results from topological graph models are useful for modeling vulnerability in electricity infrastructure, we measure the susceptibility of power networks to random failures and directed attacks using three measures of vulnerability: characteristic path lengths, connectivity loss and blackout (graph theoretic) models to assess vulnerability in electricity systems. In this article we illustrate that under some circumstances these topological models can lead to provocative, but ultimately misleading conclusions. We argue that emperical comparisons between topological models and higher fidelity models are neccessary in order to draw firm conclusions about the utility of complex networks methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the importance of reliable electricity infrastructure, numerous recent papers have applied complex networks methods 1,2 to study the structure and function of power grids. Results from these studies differ greatly. Some measure the topology of power grids and report exponential degree distributions [3] [4] [5] , whereas others report power-law distributions 6, 7 . Some models of the North American power grid suggest that power grids are more vulnerable to directed attacks than to random failures to choose the topological vulnerability measures used in this paper.
II. VULNERABILITY MEASURES
Our first vulnerability measure is characteristic path length (0 < L < ∞), which is the average distance among node pairs in a graph. In In our model, when a component fails, the "DC power-flow" equations are used to calculate changes in network flow patterns.
In the DC approximation the net power injected into a node (generation minus load:
) is equal to the total amount of power flowing to neighboring nodes through links (transmission lines or transformers): The third vector is a maximum-traffic attack, in which nodes are removed incrementally starting with those that transport the highest amounts of power. We use the term "traffic" to differentiate this measure from "load," which frequently describes the quantity of power being consumed at a node.
Thus traffic (T ) is similar to the measures described as load in 4, 9 . The following measure of node-loading is used to select maximumtraffic nodes:
The fourth vector is minimum-traffic attack, which is the inverse of the max-traffic attack. This vector is used for comparison with the conclusions in 9 , which argues that failures at low-traffic (load) nodes lead to larger blackouts than failures at high-traffic nodes.
The fifth vector is betweenness attack, in which nodes are removed incrementally, starting with those that have the highest betweenness centrality (the number of shortest paths that pass through a node 2 ). This vector was used in 4 to approximate an attack on high traffic (load) nodes, and was reported to result in disproportionately large failures.
IV. RESULTS
To compare the vulnerability measures we report results from the simulation of random 
